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Background: In 2000, the Institute of Medicine reported disturbing numbers on the scope it
covers and the impact of medical error in the process of health delivery. Nevertheless, a
solution to this problem may lie on the adoption of adverse event reporting and learning
systems that can help to identify hazards and risks. It is crucial to apply models to iden-
tify the adverse events root causes, enhance the sharing of knowledge and experience. The
efﬁciency of the efforts to improve patient safety has been frustratingly slow. Some of this
insufﬁciency of progress may be assigned to the lack of systems that take into account the
characteristic of the information about the real world. In our daily lives, we formulate most
of our decisions normally based on incomplete, uncertain and even forbidden or contra-
dictory information. One’s knowledge is less based on exact facts and more on hypothesis,
perceptions or indications.
Purpose: From the data collected on our adverse event treatment and learning system on
medical imaging, and through the use of Extended Logic Programming to knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning, and the exploitation of new methodologies for problem solving,
namely those based on the perception of what is an agent and/or multi-agent systems,
we intend to generate reports that identify the most relevant causes of error and deﬁne
improvement strategies, concluding about the impact, place of occurrence, form or type of
event recorded in the healthcare institutions.
Results and conclusions: The Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model was extended and adapted to
the medical imaging ﬁeld and used to classify adverse events root causes. Extended Logic
Programming was used for knowledge representation with defective information, allow-
ing for the modelling of the universe of discourse in terms of data and knowledge default.
A systematization of the evolution of the body of knowledge about Quality of Informa-
tion embedded in the Root Cause Analysis was accomplished. An adverse event reporting
and learning system was developed based on the presented approach to medical errors
in imaging. This system was deployed in two Portuguese healthcare institutions, with an
appealing outcome. The system enabled to verify that the majority of occurrences were con-
centrated in a few events that could be avoided. The developed system allowed automatic
knowledge extraction, enabling report generation with strategies for the improvement of
quality-of-care.
© 2011 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Currently, there is a growing awareness regarding the problem
of medical error and how it affects both the service and the
healthcare institution’s quality or, in other words, the patient
safety. According to a study undertaken by the European Com-
mission in 2005 and published in the following year, about 78%
of the inquired citizens classiﬁed medical errors as a major
problem in their countries [1].
The Institute of Medicine’s 2000 report, “To Err Is Human:
Building a Safer Health System”, focused attention sharply on
medical error and patient safety. The conclusion that more
people may die as a result of medical errors in hospitals than
from injuries sustained inmotor vehicle accidents is alarming.
The report documented that medical errors cause between
44,000 and 98,000 deaths annually in the United States. In
addition, medical errors result in annual costs of $17–$29 bil-
lion [2,3].
It is widely recognized that we may learn more from our
mistakes than from our successes. However, there is an appar-
ent failure of healthcare systems to learn from mistakes.
Too often healthcare providers do not advise others when a
mishap does occur, nor do they share what they have learnt.
As a consequence, the same mistakes occur repeatedly and
patients continue to be harmed by preventable errors. One
solution to this problem is reporting. At least, reporting can
help to identify hazards and risks, and to provide information
on the aspects that should be improved [4].
The main purpose of reporting systems is learning from
experience. However, it is important to note that only the reg-
istration of errors is not sufﬁcient to ensure patient safety. It is
the response to errors that leads to change. The accumulation
of potentially relevant data in databases contributes little to
the improvement of healthcare. A technical specialized anal-
ysis of the data is required to identify trends and patterns
[4–6].
An error can be deﬁned as the failure of a planned action
to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to
achieve an aim, and includes problems in practice, products,
procedures, and systems [7].
It is important to note that classiﬁcation systems work
best when restricted to a speciﬁc medical ﬁeld (e.g. medica-
tion errors, events of inadequate dialysis, transfusions) [4].
Although our approach has broad application in the medical
ﬁeld, we intended to focus the system on the adverse events
happening in the medical imaging department. The medi-
cal imaging is a high-risk ﬁeld for the occurrence of errors,
especially due to the multiplicity of techniques, to the sev-
eral stakeholders and to the complexity of the whole circuit
that involves the conduct of studies. In modern Medicine,
imaging studies play an important role in clinical practice.
Most of the issues identiﬁed in studies on quality and safety
in healthcare apply to Diagnostic Imaging. In the last two
decades the greater sophistication and complexity of medical
technology has led to an increase of errors. Communication,
interpretation and perceptual errors, are some of the most
common errors in medical diagnostic imaging that can lead
to e.g., misdiagnosis, wrong-side examinations, wrong-name
errors and delivering delay. The long learning curves of the
new techniques, the inappropriate training, reliance on auto-
mated systems and confusing software features, are some of
the relevant issues behind these problems [8,9].
In daily life, we make most of our decisions, if not all
of them, based on incomplete, not precise, uncertain and
even forbidden information. Knowledge is crucial to the prob-
lems of modern economy and society. In the scope of patient
safety, medical error and adverse event reporting and learn-
ing systems there are several situations where information is
insufﬁcient or incomplete.
Unfortunately,most of information systems just ignore this
characteristic of the information about the real world and
build upon models where some idealisation expunges the
inherent uncertainty [10]. The result is a system that never
provides the expected answers, due to its inability to model
the world. Instead, one should deal with the uncertainty
in the model itself. Indeed, to implement useful informa-
tion systems, namely knowledge based ones, it is necessary
to represent and reason with defective information. Several
approaches to the representation of imperfect knowledge may
be found in literature. Many of them link logic with the the-
ory of probabilities, combining Bayesian reasoning, Certainty
Factors, Dempster-Shafer theory, Fuzzy Logic or non-standard
logics [11–13].
The most effective way to prevent adverse events is to
attack directly their causes [8]. It is common that one cause
is also, somehow, a cause of various accidents. Preventing
the adverse events’ root causes improves signiﬁcantly the
patient safety [14]. Thus, our system focuses sharply on pre-
venting the adverse events’ root causes by applying a model
thatwe’ve developed speciﬁcally for themedical imaging ﬁeld.
The model served as the formal foundation to our adverse
event reporting and learning system, which is now deployed
in two Portuguese healthcare institutions. The system makes
possible to build on judgements about the impact, place of
occurrence, type of form and type of event recorded in the
healthcare institutions. It was possible to detect the adverse
events that need immediate attention, identify its causes and
generate recommendations to improvements.
In the next section, the classiﬁcation system developed
speciﬁcally for the medical imaging ﬁeld and the clinical and
theoretical concepts behind the system are presented. Based
on the formal approach presented in this section, an adverse
event reporting and learning system was developed. Section 3
presents the system, as well as the results obtained in the two
Portuguesehealthcare institutionswhere itwas implemented.
Finally, in the last section, conclusions are presented.
2. Methods
Amedical version of the EindhovenClassiﬁcationModel (ECM)
followed by the extensions and adaptations to the ECM for the
medical imaging ﬁeld and its causal tree that is used to classify
the adverse events’ root causes is presented. The theoretical
foundation based on an extension to Logic Programming, in
terms of a revision of its knowledge representation and rea-
soning system is described. By the introduction of explicit
negation, leading to a process of on-the-ﬂy quantiﬁcation of
the Quality of Information (QoI) of the predicates extensions
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Fig. 1 – Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model – medical version classiﬁcation ﬂow chart.
Adapted from van Vuuren et al. (1997) [18].
that make a logic program and theory, the possibility to study
the event’s root causes and to generate alerts and recommen-
dations on quality improvements enabled.
2.1. The Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model
A large number of different systems have been used to classify
events regarding to patient safety [15].
In the past, the lack of a standard taxonomy lead to the
adoption of different taxonomies that often hinder or prevent
the sharing of data among systems. As a result, in 2005 the
WorldHealthOrganization (WHO) started to focus its attention
in the development of an internationally agreed taxonomy of
events [4]. In January of 2009, the WHO released the ﬁnal tech-
nical report “The Conceptual Framework for the International
Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety – Version 1.1” [16]. This was
our source for terms and concepts enabling future integration
with other systems.
Many of the methods used to analyze patient safety were
adapted from risk-management techniques in industries,
especially inhigh-risk industries suchas the chemical, nuclear
power and aviation industry [14]. The EindhovenClassiﬁcation
Model (ECM) was originally developed to manage human error
in the chemical process industry and was then applied to vari-
ous other industries, such as steel industry, energy production
and in healthcare. The ECM medical version (Fig. 1) consists of
20 codes, divided into four categories (Table 1), frequently used
in a medical environment to classify the underlying causes of
the adverse events [17]. A full version of Table I with all the
ECMcategories anddescriptions is available as supplementary
Author's personal copy
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Table 1 – Categories of the Eindhoven Classiﬁcation
Model – medical version.
Category Code
Technical
External T-EX
Design TD
. . . . . .
Organizational
External O-EX
Culture OC
. . . . . .
Human behaviour
External H-EX
Knowledge-based behaviour
Knowledge-based errors HKK
Rule-based behaviour
Coordination HRC
Intervention HRI
. . . . . .
Skill-based behaviour
Slips HSS
Tripping HST
Other
Patient related factor PFR
Unclassiﬁable X
Adapted from Mers (2001) and van Vuuren et al. (1997) [14,18].
material. The main feature of ECM is to base the prevention
measures on the so-called system approach to the problem
of human error. This approach assumes that humans are
fallible and that errors are to be expected in every organiza-
tion, so it’s necessary to concentrate efforts on the conditions
under which individuals work and try to build defences to
avert errors or to mitigate their effects. Assigning codes to
the causes of each adverse event are useful for tracking and
trending [9,18–20].
Several studies present the application of the ECM in differ-
ent medical ﬁelds (e.g. blood transfusion, cardiology, surgery,
emergency) and in speciﬁc errors (e.g. thyroid gland ﬁne-
needle aspiration, tubing misconnections) [14,21–24].
The ﬁrst step when using an ECM based classiﬁcation
system is to identify the root causes that result in a speciﬁc
adverse event or noncompliance. These root causes are
subsequently classiﬁed according to the ECM. To do so, a
causal tree is built and techniques of Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) are applied [14,25]. Once the root causes are identiﬁed,
they can be used to provide a more realistic view of how the
system really works, as well as to contribute to the creation
of effective and lasting solutions [14,17,18]. Each root cause is
classiﬁed into one of the ECM categories. The major advantage
is that the classiﬁcation, as can be seen in Fig. 1, focus ﬁrstly
on system failures, rather than human ones. The category in
which root cause is classiﬁed gives a clear view of the aspect
that should be improved.
2.2. Extended Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model
The Extended Eindhoven Classiﬁcation Model (EECM) was
adapted from the ECM, presented in the previous section. To
apply this model speciﬁcally to the medical imaging ﬁeld,
extensions were developed for each category of the original
model. These extensions allow ﬁtting each category into the
medical imaging ﬁeld and providing a broader view of the
events’ that may occur and the degree of complexity of this
ﬁeld. Some examples, for each pre-deﬁned classiﬁcation cat-
egory were also included, in order to identify adverse events
that meet the deﬁnition and the scope of each category. Thus,
the classiﬁcation process becomes easier and more efﬁcient
[25]. In Table 2 a subset of the EECM and some examples
of events for the classiﬁcation model’s categories are pre-
sented. A full version of Table 2 is available as supplementary
material.
For instance, in the original model, the adverse events
classiﬁed as “Human behaviour – Knowledge-based errors” (HKK)
occur due to “the inability of an individual to apply existing knowl-
edge to a novel situation”. In the speciﬁc ﬁeld ofmedical imaging,
we extend this deﬁnition by saying that the events classiﬁed
under this category are due to “difﬁculties in execution, interpre-
tation or reporting studies”. Some of the adverse events falling
into this category are “poorly executed reports, false positives, false
negatives and reports poorly validated”.
The causal trees taken on by the original ECM put up on
hand the recognition of the event’s root causes and its men-
tal picture under a hierarchical structure. On the other hand,
once one has to deal with incomplete and even contradictory
information, we look to an Extension of Logic programming,
namely Extended Logic Programming (ELP), to knowledge rep-
Table 2 – ECM codes – medical imaging extended version (subset) [25].
Code Extension to Medical Imaging ﬁeld Examples
T-EX Equipment’s malfunction (e.g. CT, MRI, printers). Studies not saved (necessary repeat the study).
Failure of computer systems: digital dictation system,
heating/ventilation system.
Studies not performed.
Study not scheduled or irregular schedule.
OC Lack of errors reporting systems. Incapacity to react in adverse situations.
Services not hierarchical.
Absence of procedure’s rules.
Absence of periodic audits.
Lack of training in the area of security.
Informed consent not established.
Absence of protocols for action in emergency situations.
HKK Difﬁculties in execution, interpretation or reporting studies. Report poorly executed.
False positives and false negatives.
Reports poorly validated.
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Fig. 2 – Structure of a causal tree extended with incomplete information operators: (A) general structure; (B) all possible
cases.
resentation and reasoning, in order to get a truth value or
measure of conﬁdence in any qualiﬁcation process suscep-
tible to be handled by the system. Since, an event may only
occur due to the combination of more than one cause and a
different event may come about due to two or more causes,
taken separately, in the original model “AND-gates” and “OR-
gates” are used, respectively, to embody these two possibilities
in the causal tree. The usual situations can also include the
case where only one cause leads to the occurrence of a cer-
tain event. In any of these cases the adverse events origins
are known, i.e., there is a certainty about the events grounds.
Beyond these situations, can also come about that the causes
of an event, action or decision are unknown; may be known
that certain views are the source of a given event, but may
not be sure what are the event grounds; or it is not allowed to
know the basis of a given event (e.g., due to internal policies
of the healthcare institution).
Therefore, it is proposed the use of “unknown” and “for-
bidden” operators, to allow for the representation of unknown
values of an inﬁnite set of values, unknown values of a given
set of values and values not allowed or forbidden (Fig. 2). The
information contained in each causal tree is then represented
in ELP by the extensions of a predicate set. Furthermore, it was
adopted as a formalism to quantify the QoI present in each
causal tree (see Section 2.3). The QoI allows for the identiﬁca-
tion of the causes that should be taken into account, in ﬁrst
place, and how they hamper all the classiﬁcation process. The
information obtained in this way to the Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) enables automatic report generation with improvement
recommendations.
Fig. 3 presents the application of the EECM to the adverse
event “study not available for delivery on time”. The selection
of this event is related to its high frequency of occurrence
veriﬁed by our reporting and learning system installed in
two Portuguese healthcare institutions. In the source of this
event there is a great diversity of reasons. It’s possible that
only one situation could be enough for the event to occur
or, perhaps, it may be necessary a combination of several
factors.
These extended causal trees are built in close collabo-
ration with highly skilled healthcare professionals. All the
actions, decisions and root causes are subject of an exhaustive
study before getting the ﬁnal structure of the causal trees. The
causal trees include all possible causes and aim to be a generic
representation of the problem. For a particular occurrence of
the event, its causes will fall on a branch of the tree.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 3 – Extended causal tree for the adverse event “study not available to delivery on time”.
2.3. Knowledge representation and Quality of
Information
Intelligent systems require the ability to reason with incom-
plete and even contradictory information, even in the most
unnatural situations.
In a classical logical theory or logic program, the proof of
a theorem (here understood as a question submitted to the
classiﬁcation system) the outcome is a truth value, namely
true or false [30].
An Extended Logic Program (ELP), on the other hand, is
a ﬁnite collection of rules of the form [31]. ELP introduces
another kind of negation, strong negation, represented by the
classical negation sign¬. In most situations, it is useful to rep-
resent ¬A as a literal, if it is possible to prove ¬A. In ELP, the
expressions A and not A, being A a literal, are extended liter-
als, while A or ¬A are simple literals. Intuitively, not p is true
whenever there is no reason to believe p, whereas ¬p requires
a proof of the negated literal.
Every program is associated with a set of abducibles.
Abducibles can be seen as hypotheses that provide possible
solutions or explanations of given queries, being given here in
the form of exceptions to the extensions of the predicates that
make the program.
The issue is providing expressive power for representing
explicitly negative information, as well as to directly describe
the Closed World Assumption (CWA) for some predicates,
also known as predicate circumscription [32,33]. Three types of
answers to a given question are then possible, i.e. true, false
and unknown. The representation of null values will be scoped
by the ELP. We consider three types of null values: the ﬁrst will
allow for the representation of unknown values, not necessar-
ily taken from a given set of values, the second will represent
unknown values taken from a given set of possible values and
the third will deﬁne values that are not allowed or forbidden.
Taking the example of the adverse event “study not available
to delivery on time” it could represent all the possible situations
according to the following examples:
• It is known that the study was not available for delivery on
time because it was not ready – known value.
• The adverse event encompasses some conduct and judge-
ment on its foundation on which it is not possible to be clear
(afﬁrmative) – unknown value.
• The healthcare professional that reported the adverse
event, did not know if the study report was not ready, once
the report was not transcript, reviewed or validated. It is not
possible to be constructive, concerning the action or truth
value to consider. However, it is false that the action or deci-
sion could be different. This situation suggests that the lack
of knowledge may be associated to a set of possible known
values – unknown value in a ﬁnite set of values.
• Andﬁnally, namely due to internal policies of thehealthcare
institution, it is not permitted to know the causes of a given
event – forbidden or not allowed values.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 4 – Quality of Information about the question “Which
are the actions or decisions that led to the adverse event
occurrence?”.
Therefore, and using ELP, as the logic programming language,
it is now possible to set a procedure given in terms of the
extension of a predicate called demo:question,answer → [0,1].
Given a question, it returns a truth-value based on a set of
assumptions that will allow one to reason about the body of
knowledge presented in a particular domain. Given a ques-
tion, it returns a solution based on a set of assumptions,where
question indicates a theorem to be proved and answer denotes
a truth value (see Program 1; true (1), false (0), being U in the
range of the truth values]0,1[).
demo(Q,T)← Q
demo(Q,F)← ¬Q
demo(Q,U)← not Q ∧ not ¬Q
Program 1. Extension of meta-predicate demo.
Indeed, in any decision making process, arguably, the deci-
sion is made without having all the information. What makes
a decision maker to be conﬁdent about the reliability of the
information?
Using the procedure at hand in the supplementary
material, a picture as the one given in Fig. 4 to represent the
reliability of the information concerned to a root cause anal-
ysis, is shaped. Here, the dashed n-slices of the circle denote
de QoI that is associated with each of the predicate extensions
that make the logic program.
As an example, we represent the QoI associated with the
information about the RCA of the adverse event study not
available to delivery on time, according to the three mentioned
situations, depicted in Fig. 4. In order to ﬁnd the relationships
among the extensions of these predicates, we evaluate the
relevance of the QoI, which is given in the form:
It is nowpossible tomeasure theQoI associated to theques-
tion put in context of the logic program, which was given in
the form which are the actions or decisions that led to the adverse
event occurrence?. The shaded n-slices (here n is equal to 3) of
the circle denote the QoI. A detailed description with prac-
tical examples of these issues is available as supplementary
material.
3. Results and discussion
Based on the formal approach referred to above, on medical
errors in imaging, an adverse event reporting and learning
system (AEMI) was developed. Indeed, to the healthcare pro-
fessionals, or the quality department and mostly for all the
healthcare institution, this approach brings several advan-
tages. After the adverse events being registered, similar to
what happens in other reporting systems, the analysis process
becomes easier,more expedite and reliable. Undoubtedly,with
the recourse to ELP, leading to an on-the-ﬂy measurement of
the QoI of the logic terms used in the process of judgement
(in terms of a theorem to be proved), the human interven-
tion in the analyze process is only necessary to approve the
recommendations, causes and events that need attention. It
also caters for the credibility and the measurement of the efﬁ-
cacy of the implemented strategies and actions. The AEMI
is a voluntary, conﬁdential and non-punitive system, com-
prising three core modules, making it, not only a system for
adverse event registration, but also a learning system, as men-
tioned above. Fig. 5 presents the overall view of the developed
system.
Adverse Event Reporting Forms in Medical Imaging
(AERFMI) module provides the Web interface for adverse event
registration. The effort on this interface was focused in its
usability. The event registration ismadebyprofessionals of the
healthcare institution (e.g. physicians, administrators, radi-
ology technicians) and by the public, through pre-deﬁned
forms adapted to each user proﬁle reality. A screen shot
of the Adverse Events and Near Misses Reporting Web Por-
tal –AERFMI module can be seen in the supplementary
material.
Adverse Events Manager Reports in Medical Imaging (AER-
MMI)module is alsoWebbasedandaims to enable the analysis
of the adverse events recorded by AERFMI, based on the devel-
oped classiﬁcation model. By applying the EECM the system
allows to deﬁne improvement recommendations to reduce or
eliminate the underlying organization failures. The system
provides an individual report for each adverse event recorded
which includes all its details and the extended causal tree
obtained using the EECM. An example of the causal tree report
is available in the supplementary material. These reports are
automatically generated without human intervention. The
user only has to access the needed report. Indeed, the event
details are just a representation ofwhat is stored in the system
data base. The causal tree construction and the recommenda-
tions presented in the reports are only possible to be obtained
thanks to the presented approach by applying the EECM and
using ELP to knowledge representation and reasoning pur-
poses.
These generated reports help the task of the quality depart-
ment that use similar paper based reports (see supplementary
material). Moreover, these generated reports focus attention
on the most important feature of the event: its causes. The
time and hand-labour needed to examine all the registers
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 5 – Overall view of the AEMI system.
at the same time, look for patterns and trends, is drastically
reduced. All the information is stored in a common database
that facilitates access for further processing, being object of a
formal proof.
The AERMMI module also provides charts with statistical
information about the impact, place of occurrence, type of
form and type of event recorded. These charts are updated
on the ﬂy as more adverse events are registered and placed
available online.
From recorded data in two Portuguese healthcare institu-
tions it was possible to verify that the adverse event “study
not available for delivery on time” had a much higher fre-
quency than the other events registered through the system
(event “E2” in Fig. 6), being a situation that deserved imme-
diate attention. With the individual reports of each recorded
event provide by the system it was possible to determine
what actions and causes contribute the most to this adverse
event occurrence. It is important to note that these actions
and causes were identiﬁed by the system and presented
to the users by the reports generated through the AERMMI
module. The main cause was “study in the physician pos-
session”, because “physician took the study for reading at
home”. By applying the EECM it was highlighted the need
to change the Organizational Culture (code OC from the
EECM). This need was also automatically included in the
system’s reports, as happens to all the needs and recom-
mendations identiﬁed by the system to all the adverse events
registered.
In the speciﬁc case of the adverse event “study not available
for delivery on time” measures were taken to assure that the
studies do not leave the healthcare institution; the radiologist
started to receive automatically a SMS warning, 48h before
the delivery deadline; 24h before the delivery deadline ends
the study will be read by another radiologist and a SMS was
sent to inform the ﬁrst radiologist.
It was possible to verify that the impact of the adverse
events recorded in the two healthcare institutions is, mostly,
mild (Fig. 7(A)). This impact is a measure of the degree of harm
to the patient. Despite the impact of adverse events, such as
“study not available for delivery on time”, be typically mild,
the ﬁnancial costs that such event brings to the healthcare
institutions, related not only with technical aspects but also
with the quality image of the institution, is enough to be cru-
cial to prevent its occurrence and take immediate actions. It
was also possible to verify that most of the events occur with
the Ultrasound modality (Fig. 7(B)).
In the twohealthcare institutions, the userswith the physi-
cians’ role were the ones that made the higher number of
records (Fig. 7(C)). Although physicians frequently show an
aversion to this type of systems, this aversion was not notori-
ous. Perhaps because it was made very clear that this system
doesnot intend to be ameasure of individual performance, but
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 6 – Screenshot of statistical analysis available in the Web interface of the AEMI: frequency of adverse events recorded.
rather a tool for improvement. On the other hand, the users
with a radiology technician’s role were the staff that less used
the system. The public and the administrators adhered mod-
erately. One major advantage of the developed system is the
fact of a patient can register an adverse event. Often a patient
has a completely different view of the adverse event, thus, his
opinion is a valuable contribution to properly understand the
event and its causes.
Fig. 7 – Screenshot of statistical analysis available in the Web interface of the AEMI: (A) percentage of events registered by
impact; (B) percentage of events registered by place of occurrence; (C) percentage of events by the registration form used; (D))
percentage of events registered by type.
Author's personal copy
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The most frequent type of adverse event recorded was
the study type (Fig. 7(D)), which implies that it is essential
to review and redeﬁne some of the procedures and methods
used.
The Knowledge Manager Adverse Events in Medical Imag-
ing (AEKMMI) module is a Java application. This module uses
the data from the system database to create a Knowledge
Base (KB), which although had been given in terms of ELP, is
now rewritten to productions in the logic programming lan-
guage Prolog, based on the EECM. From the KB other reports
relevant to the improvement of the healthcare service can
be generated, always with the assurance of the data reliabil-
ity and credibility by taking into account the QoI. A screen
shot of the AEKMMI interface is available as supplementary
material.
4. Conclusions
The main contribution of this work is to be understood in
terms of the evaluation of the QoI in the RCA and the possibil-
ity to address the issue of incomplete information, through the
use of an extension to Logic Programming in the construction
of causal trees. ELP was used for knowledge representation
and reasoning with defective information, catering for the
modelling of the universe of discourse in terms of incomplete,
inconsistent, forbidden and default data and knowledge. A
systematisation of the body of knowledge’s evolution about
QoI embedded in the RCA was made. A way to solve the rep-
resentation problem of defective information was presented,
adequate for evaluation the QoI in such process. It was also
presented a computationally feasible formal tool to measure
the value of QoI.
Although the causal classiﬁcation of events is sometimes
time-consuming and difﬁcult, with the development of a
generic causal tree for each possible event, the increase in
time consuming is on the initial phase of the model appli-
cation. The QoI allows for the ordering of causes, identifying
the ones that should be taken into account in the ﬁrst place.
In the generic tree it is necessary to consider all possible
causes, rather than most probable or usual ones. The infor-
mation obtained is useful in identifying possible trends and
areas requiring further investigation.
The conceptualized logic model offers the means for
knowledge extraction, providing the identiﬁcation of the most
signiﬁcant causes and suggestions of changes in the health-
care organization policies and procedures, subject to formal
proof. Indeed, the creation of an inference system in support
of the logical model enables the generation of reports with
strategies for quality improvement on-the-ﬂy, with a mea-
sure of the systemıˇs conﬁdence on the results, in terms of
the QoI, i.e., an adverse event reporting and learning system
was developed for medical errors in imaging. This system was
deployed in two Portuguese healthcare institutions presenting
useful results. The system enabled to verify that the majority
of occurrences were concentrate in a few events that could
be avoided. With our approach to RCA and classiﬁcation it
was possible to identify the causes, actions and decisions that
lead to the adverse events and deﬁne the strategies to prevent
them.
Summary points
Existing knowledge on medical errors and patient safety:
• There is an apparent failure of healthcare systems to
learn from mistakes. One solution to this problem is
reporting.
• The accumulation of potentially relevant data in
databases contributes little to the improvement of
healthcare.
• Classiﬁcation systems work best when restricted to a
speciﬁc medical ﬁeld. The most effective way to pre-
vent adverse events is to attack directly their causes.
• Most the systems ignore the characteristic of the infor-
mation about the real world and build upon models
where some idealization expunges the inherent uncer-
tainty
What this study added:
• An adverse event reporting and learning system for
medical imaging based on a speciﬁc classiﬁcation
model process focus on ﬁnding the underlining sys-
tem failures is much more efﬁcient in preventing the
adverse events once the real root causes are identi-
ﬁed and measures are put into action to enhance the
system quality.
• The extension of ECM to the medical imaging ﬁeld tak-
ing into account the systems failures and the adverse
events root causes proved to be a useful tool to iden-
tify the systemaspect of thehealthcare institution that
should be improved.
• The use of logic operators in the causal trees construc-
tion and the evaluation of the QoI in the RCA process
allowed modelling the real world where incomplete
and uncertain information prevails.
• A logic representation of the information contained in
the causal tress highlights the knowledge extraction
and enables the automatic generation of reports with
strategies for quality improvement.
• With the implemented system it was possible to
automatically conclude about the impact, place of
occurrence, type of form and type of event recorded
in the healthcare institutions, and detect the adverse
events that need immediate attention, identify its
causes and generate improvement recommendations.
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